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Abstract
We address the problem of fair division, or cake cutting, with the goal of finding truthful
mechanisms. In the case of a general measure space (“cake”) and non-atomic, additive individual
preference measures - or utilities - we show that there exists a truthful “mechanism” which
ensures that each of the k players gets at least 1/k of the cake. This mechanism also minimizes
risk for truthful players. Furthermore, in the case where there exist at least two different
measures we present a different truthful mechanism which ensures that each of the players gets
more than 1/k of the cake.
We then turn our attention to partitions of indivisible goods with bounded utilities and a
large number of goods. Here we provide similar mechanisms, but with slightly weaker guarantees.
These guarantees converge to those obtained in the non-atomic case as the number of goods
goes to infinity.
1 Introduction
The basic setting of fair partition problems includes a “cake” - some divisible resource - and a
number of players, each with different preferences with regards to the different “pieces” of the cake.
The task is to divide the cake among the players in a way that would be “fair” according to some
fairness notion. This applies to numerous situations, from divorce trials to nuclear arms reduction,
see e.g. [1].
This problem has been studied extensively both in the non-atomic case and in the case of
indivisible goods. In this paper we take a fresh look at fair division, by approaching it from the
mechanism design point of view, and in particular in search of truthful partition mechanisms.
1.1 Background
The problem of fair division, or cake cutting, is a central and classical problem in economics. A
fair partition is one where each of k players receives at least 1/k of the cake, each according to her
own measure (this is also known as a proportional partition). Fair partition into two parts has long
been known to be possible using a “cut-and-choose” procedure: a cake is guaranteed to be fairly
divided in two if one player cuts it and the other picks a piece.
Fair partition to more than two players requires non-trivial mathematics. The founding work
in this field was done by Steinhaus, Knaster and Banach in the forties (e.g. [7], [12], [13]). They
and others (e.g. [10]) proved existence theorems for fair division on general measure spaces and
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non-atomic measures, where “fairness” was again, in general, taken to mean that each of k players
receives at least 1/k of the cake, each according to her own measure. These proofs are not con-
structive, but nevertheless were useful in generalizing “cut-and-choose” to more than two players.
Another natural approach is “moving knife algorithms”, first described by Dubins and Spanier
[4]. These are not algorithms in the modern Turing Machine sense of the word (as “cut-and-choose”
and its generalizations aren’t), but still provide a “practical” way to cut actual cakes, if nothing
else, by the same fairness criterion mentioned above.
A stronger concept of fairness is that of “envy-free” partitions ([6],[14]). In an envy free partition
there is no player who would trade her allocation with one given to another player. Such partitions
have been studied extensively (e.g., see [1]).
Partitioning indivisible goods is a more recently studied variant, which places the problem in
a standard algorithmic setup. However, it is easy to see that fairness or envy-freeness could not
be achieved in every setup as the example of one good demonstrates. Still, the results of Lipton
et al. [8] show that almost envy free partitions exist. These are partitions where no player envies
another player by more than the value of a single good.
Classical cake cutting mechanisms such as “cut-and-choose” usually require the players to choose
a piece of a subset of the cake or make a cut in it, according to their preferences. Alternatively,
the mechanism queries the player about her valuation of a particular piece of the cake. We take
an approach which is more prevalent in the modern mechanism design world: each player declares
their preference (i.e., their entire measure on the cake) to some “third party”, which then proceeds
to divide the cake according to a predetermined algorithm.
While circulating a draft of this paper, it was brought to our attention that similar questions
are discusses in a recent working paper by Chen et al. [3]. They restrict themselves to a particular
class of measures: “the case where the agents hold piecewise uniform valuation functions, that
is, each agent is interested in a collection of subintervals of [0, 1] with the same marginal value
for each fractional piece in each subinterval.” In this setting, they show a truthful, deterministic,
polynomial-time, fair and envy-free mechanism. For the more general setting which we study they
independently derive our mechanism 2.1.
1.1.1 Truthfulness
The notion of truthfulness is very natural in partitioning problems. Why would a player declare
her true measure if declaring a different measure would result in a better partition for her?
The “cut-and-choose” method is in some sense truthful: the players don’t have to trust each
other to be guaranteed a half of the cake. However, it is not truthful in the sense that players
have incentive to “strategize” in order to increase the value of the piece they receive. For example,
assume that the players’ preferences differ, and that the first player (the “cutter”) knows, or guesses,
the second player’s (the “chooser”) preference. She may then cut the cake into two pieces such
that the first piece is worth much more than one half to herself, and 12 − ǫ to the chooser. This
would, perhaps, secure her a large piece of the cake, and leave the chooser with the feeling that
dealings were not completely fair. To further confound matters we note that the chooser may
realize, in this setting, that she could gain a larger piece by manipulating the cutter’s perception
of her preferences.
As noted in [1], many of the partition mechanisms which were discovered in the non-atomic
case have this same weaker truthfulness property; for fair partitions - they have the property that
truthful players are guaranteed to receive at least 1/k of their total value of the cake. Similarly for
envy free partitions every truthful player is guaranteed not to envy any of the other players.
Still the question remains as to why is it beneficial for a player to declare her true value?
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A work which addresses this question is a paper by Lipton et al. [8] who analyze a truthful
mechanism for allocating a set of indivisible goods: simply give each good to each of k players with
probability 1/k. This mechanism is further analyzed in [2], who showed that this partition results,
with high probability, in O(α
√
n ln k) envy, where n is the number of goods, k is the number of
players, and α is the maximum utility over all goods and players.
The strongest possible notion of truthfulness is the following: a mechanism is truthful if it is
always the case that a player’s utility when declaring the truth is as high as her utility when lying.
The notion of [8, 2] is weaker. They focus, as we do, on truthfulness in expectation: the expected
value of a player’s utility is maximal when telling the truth.
1.2 Our Results
1.2.1 Non Atomic Measures
Although our “third party” approach is one of modern mechanism design, our work in the non-
atomic setup lies in the realm of classical fair division, in that it does not consider the computational
aspects of the mechanisms: in some cases, an infinite amount of information would have to be
conveyed to the third party. Even when not, the calculations required may be intractable or even
not recursive.
We first consider the problem of a truthful fair partition with non-atomic measures. For this
problem, using a result of Steinhaus [13], we show that such a partition always exists. Furthermore,
our mechanism particularly incentivizes risk averse players to play truthfully.
We next ask if it is possible to devise a truthful mechanism that guarantees that each player
gets more than 1/k of the cake. Obviously the answer is negative if all the measures are the same.
However, as mentioned by Steinhaus [12] and proved by Dubins and Spanier [4], if the measures are
not all identical, then there exists a partition where each player gets more than 1/k of the entire
cake.
Our main result is a truthful in expectation mechanism which guarantees that each player gets
at least 1/k of the cake, and furthermore the expected size of the piece each player gets is strictly
larger than 1/k.
We further show that there exists no deterministic and truthful mechanism that gives these
guarantees and so only in the weaker notion of truthfulness it is possible to obtain such results.
An additional argument in favor of randomized mechanisms is that a deterministic mechanism
cannot be symmetric: when all the players declare the same preferences, it must arbitrarily break
the symmetry and assign different players different slices of the cake. A randomized algorithm can
avoid this.
1.2.2 Indivisible Goods
Our results presented in the case of non-atomic measures are existential; we do not provide pro-
tocols for implementing them. To address the computational aspect of the problem we consider
partitions of a large number of indivisible goods where the number of goods n is exponential in
the number of players, and the utility of a single good is bounded. We give efficient versions of
all of our mechanisms in this setup, with guarantees that are slightly weaker than those provided
in the continuous case. The guarantees hold in expectation, and moreover there is a deterministic
guarantee for each player to receive a share of the goods which is at least (1 − ǫ) of the expected
value, where ǫ = O(Mk/n) where k is the number of players, n is the number of goods and M is
the maximum utility of a single good.
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More generally, we prove a discrete analogue to a theorem of Dubins and Spanier [4]. They
show that the space of partition utilities is convex. We show that the same is true in the discrete
case, again up to a factor of (1− ǫ), as defined above.
2 Continuous Truthful Mechanisms
2.1 Existence Theorems for Fair Divisions
Dubins and Spanier [4], rephrasing Fisher [5], provide the following description of what they call
“The problem of the Nile”:
“Each year the Nile would flood, thereby irrigating or perhaps devastating parts of the agri-
cultural land of a predynastic Egyptian village. The value of different portions of the land would
depend upon the height of the flood. In question was the possibility of giving to each of the k
residents a piece of land whose value would be 1/k of the total land value no matter what the
height of the flood.”
Neyman [10] showed that this is possible, given that there are a finite number of levels that the
Nile can rise to.
Let C be a “cake” (a set), and C a set of “slices” (a σ-algebra of subsets of C). Let there be
k players, and let µ1, . . . , µk be non-atomic probability (additive) measures on (C,C), so that the
value of a slice C ∈ C to player i is µi(C). Then Neyman’s theorem establishes that there exists a
partition of the cake C1, . . . , Ck such that for all players i and slices j it holds that µi(Cj) = 1/k.
Hence all the slices are equal, by all the player’s measures.
Dubins and Spanier [4] show that a better partition is always possible when at least two of the
players have different measures. Their theorem implies that in this case a partition is possible for
which, for all players and slices i, it holds that µi(Ci) > 1/k, and so each player gets strictly more
than 1/k of the cake, by his or her own measure.
2.2 Truthful Mechanisms
2.2.1 Fair division
We present a simple truthful “mechanism” for distributing the cake among k players, which assures
that each player gets precisely 1/k of the cake, by all the players’ measures. It is a “mechanism” in
quotes since it is as constructive as Neyman’s theorem, which is not constructive. Note that this
mechanism also appears in [3].
Mechanism 2.1. Assume the players’ true measures are µ1, . . . , µk, and that they each declare
some measure νi. Find a partition C1, . . . , Ck such that ∀i, j : νi(Cj) = 1/k. Then choose a
random permutation τ of size k, from the uniform distribution, and give Cτ(i) to player i.
Proposition 2.2. Mechanism 2.1 is truthful in the following sense: No player can increase her
expected utility by playing non-truthfully. Further, a player who plays truthfully minimizes the
risk/variance of the measure of the piece she gets.
Proof. The expected size of the slice for player i is
∑
j µi(Cj)P[τ(i) = j] =
∑
j µi(Cj)/k =
µi(∪Cj)/k = 1/k. Since it is independent of νi then player i has no incentive to declare un-
truthfully. Furthermore, a player that declares νi = µi is guaranteed a slice of size 1/k, and so the
truth minimizes the variance (or risk), to zero.
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2.2.2 Super-fair division
For this result we set C = [0, 1) ∈ R and let C be the Borel σ-algebra. While this result can be
extended to more general classes of spaces and algebras, we present it in this restricted form for
clarity. We consider the case where at least one pair of measures are not equal, i.e. the case in
which “super-fair” partitions exist — partitions in which µi(Ci) > 1/k.
We first provide motivation for our usage of “truthfulness in expectation”, by showing that
deterministic “super-fair” mechanisms cannot be truthful:
Theorem 2.3. Any deterministic mechanism that gives each player 1/k of the cake when all
declared measures are equal and more than 1/k of the cake otherwise is not truthful.
Proof. Consider the case where all players declare the same arbitrary measure µ. Then they receive
slices Ci such that ∀i : µ(Ci) = 1/k. Now, consider the case where player 1’s true measure ν is
such that ν(C1) = 1. Then player 1’s utility for declaring µ is 1. We propose that her utility for
declaring ν (i.e., being truthful) is less than one, and therefore the mechanism is not truthful.
Assume by way of contradiction that her utility for declaring ν is one. Then in this case she
must also receive slice C1, since that is the only slice worth one to her. But if player 1 receives C1
then the rest of the players have, by their measure µ, exactly (k−1)/k of the cake left to share, and
so it is impossible that they all receive more than 1/k of it. This contradicts the hypothesis, since
µ(C1) = 1/k and ν(C1) = 1, and therefore µ 6= ν and all players must receive more than 1/k.
We now describe a randomized mechanism that is “super-fair” and truthful in expectation.
Mechanism 2.4. Assume again that µ1, . . . , µk are the players’ true measures, and that they each
declare some measure νi. To distribute the cake, pick a partition C1, . . . , Ck from a distribution D
over partitions, which we describe below. If it so happens that νi(Ci) > 1/k for all i, then distribute
the slices accordingly. Otherwise distribute by mechanism 2.1, that is, give a slice of value 1/k to
all players.
Proposition 2.5. In mechanism 2.4 the expected utility of a truthful player is larger than 1/k if
super-fair partitions are picked with positive probability.
Proof. If C1, . . . , Ck is super-fair and the players are truthful, then this partition is recognized as
super-fair, and the players each get strictly more than 1/k. In the event that the picked partition
is not super-fair, and the players are truthful, then the mechanism reverts to giving the players
precisely 1/k of the cake. Thus the expectation for truthful players is more than 1/k.
Proposition 2.6. In mechanism 2.4 playing truthfully maximizes a player’s expected utility.
Proof. Consider again two cases: the first, in which C1, . . . , Ck is super-fair, and the second, in
which it isn’t.
In the first event, a truthful player’s expected share is more than 1/k. Playing untruthfully
could either have no effect, leaving the utility as is, or else the only other possibility is that the
partition is misconstrued not to be super-fair, in which case the player’s utility is reduced to 1/k.
In the second event, in which the partition picked is not super-fair, playing untruthfully may
again have no effect, leaving the utility at 1/k. However, if, to some player, the share allocated
by this partition was worth less than 1/k, playing untruthfully may make it seem to be valued at
more then 1/k, turning the partition into super-fair by the declared preferences, and resulting in a
utility less than 1/k for that player.
Thus, for any random choice of C1, . . . , Ck the truthful player’s expected utility is maximal,
and the proposition follows.
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To assure that this mechanism results in a slice of expected size strictly greater than 1/k, we
must find a distribution D (from which we draw the partition) such that for any set of measures,
where at least one pair is not equal, with positive probability µi(Ci) > 1/k for all i. To this end
we make the following definition:
Definition 2.7. Denote by Q the set of partitions C1, . . . , Ck of [0, 1) ∈ R for which each Ci is a
finite union of half-open intervals with rational endpoints.
We note that Q is countable. D now need only be some distribution with support Q:
Theorem 2.8. Let µ1, . . . , µk be non-atomic probability measures on [0, 1) ∈ R and the Borel σ-
algebra, such that there exist i, j for which µi 6= µj. Let D be a distribution over the partitions
C1, . . . , Ck of [0, 1) into k sets, such that the support of D is Q. Then
PD[∀i : µi(Ci) > 1/k] > 0.
The proof appears in Appendix A.
3 Indivisible Goods
Let C = {a1, . . . , an} be a finite set of indivisible goods (“discrete cake”). Let there be k players,
where each has an additive bounded measure (utility) on the algebra of subsets of C, µi, such that
for all i, j it holds that µi({aj}) ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
We focus on the regime where the number of players is small, so that n≫Mk, and in particular
Mk ·Mk/n < ǫ for some ǫ. Then it also holds that Mk ·Mk/µi(C) < ǫ.
3.1 Truthful fair division
Let ν1, . . . , νk be the set of declared measures.
Definition 3.1. Let S = (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}k be some vector. Let the bin BS ⊆ C be the
set of goods a for which, for each player i, it holds that a ∈ BS iff νi(a) = si:
BS = {a ∈ C s.t. ∀i : νi(a) = si} (1)
Let B be the set of bins.
We propose the following mechanism:
Mechanism 3.2. For each bin BS, pick from the uniform distribution a partition of it into k parts
of equal size B1S, . . . , B
k
S, with perhaps some left over elements which number at most k − 1. Let
C ′i =
⋃
BS∈B
BiS and give C
′
i to player i. Then, give each leftover good to some player, uniformly
at random.
Denote by Ci the set that player i got, i.e. C
′
i union any leftovers given to player i. Then it is
easy to see that this mechanism is truthful, since player i’s expectation is µi(C)/k, independently
of her declared measure νi:
Proposition 3.3.
E[µi(Cj)] = µi(C)/k
Proof. This follows from the fact that every al ends up in Cj with probability 1/k.
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Truthfulness, however, could have been more simply achieved by, for example, giving each player
the entire set C with probability 1/k. This mechanism’s merit is that it ensures low risk for truthful
players:
Theorem 3.4. When νi = µi then for all j it holds that µi(Cj) ≥ (1− ǫ)µi(C)/k.
when i = j this implies low risk for truthful players.
Proof. By definition of the Cj’s
µi(Cj) ≥ µi(C ′j) = µi

 ⋃
BS∈B
BjS

 .
Since the different BiS ’s are disjoint, and by the definition of BS
µi(Cj) ≥
∑
BS∈B
µi(B
j
S) ≥
∑
BS∈B
si|BjS |.
We denote the number of left over elements rS , so that |BS | = k|BiS |+ rS for all i. Then
µi(Cj) ≥ µi(C)
k
− 1
k
∑
BS∈B
sirS ,
since rS < k and si ≤M , and by the definition of ǫ we finally have that
µi(Cj) ≥ µi(C)
k
− Mk ·M
k
k
≥ (1− ǫ)µi(C)/k. (2)
We conclude that assuming players are averse to risk, they may find actual advantage in playing
truthfully, since that will result in a utility that is with probability one greater than (1− ǫ)µi(C)/k.
Other strategies, on the other hand, may run the risk of resulting in lower utility.
3.2 Truthful super-fair division
We can naturally adapt mechanism 2.4 to the discrete case, by letting D be the uniform (for
example) distribution over the partitions of C = {a1, . . . , an} into k subsets. We then use what is
essentially the same mechanism:
Mechanism 3.5. Pick a random partition from D, keep it iff everyone was allocated strictly more
than 1/k, and otherwise give everyone 1/k using mechanism 3.2.
In this discrete case it is easy to see that if super-fair divisions exist then they are picked with
positive probability. The proofs that this mechanism results in expected utility larger than 1/k,
and that it is truthful, are identical to the ones for the continuous case, 2.5 and 2.6.
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3.3 Extending continuous fair division existence results
Let M be the space of k-by-n matrices M such that for measures µ1, . . . , µk and some division
C1, . . . , Cn it holds that Mij = µi(Cj). Dubins and Spanier [4], using a theorem of Lyapunov [9],
prove that M is compact and convex when the measures µi are non-atomic. From this follow a
plethora of existence theorems for partitions of different characteristics. For example, as mentioned
above, this fact can be used to show that there exists a division where each of the k players gets
a share worth 1/k by everyone’s measure (for probability measures). It can also be used to show
that some players have different measures then a division exists in which every player gets more
than 1/k, by her own measure.
This result obviously does not apply to the discrete case; the set of partitions is finite and it
is difficult to speak of convexity. Accordingly, in the general case no fair partition exists, and a
super-fair partition may not exist even when the preferences are different. A simple example of two
goods and three players suffices to illustrate this point.
One could, however, imagine that all this could be achieved if the players were somehow able to
share the goods. In fact, if we allow, for example, that one player has a third of a good and another
two thirds of it (with appropriate utilities), then Dubins and Spanier’s results apply again, and a
wealth of partitions with different qualities is possible again. We refer to this as the continuous
extension of the discrete problem.
However, indivisible goods must by nature remain indivisible. To overcome this, we propose a
randomized partition, similar to the one used in mechanism 3.2, that makes possible, in expectation,
any partition values possible in the continuous extension. Moreover, it assures that each player not
only receives the correct utility in expectation, but that in the worst case she will not receive less
than 1− ǫ of what she expects.
We thus consider again a set of indivisible goods C = {a1, . . . , al}, k players, and their additive
measures µi, where µi({aj}) ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. We now imagine that each good can be continuously
subdivided, and so define a∗j to be copy of [0, 1] ∈ R, and let C∗ = {a∗1, . . . , a∗l }. Let F be the
standard Borel σ-algebra on C∗, and let ν be the Lebesgue measure on F. Define µ∗i , a measure on
F, as a continuous extension of µi by
µ∗i (A) =
∑
j
µi({aj}) · ν(A ∩ a∗j ),
for any A ∈ F. We refer to C∗ and µ∗i as the continuous extension of C and µi.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section:
Theorem 3.6. Consider the problem of partitioning indivisible goods as defined above, and its
continuous extension. Let M be the space of k-by-n matrices M such that for some C∗1 , . . . , C∗n it
holds that Mij = µ
∗
i (C
∗
j ).
Then for every element M ∈ M there exists a randomized partition C1, . . . , Cn satisfying
E[µi(Cj)] =Mij, and moreover
µ∗i (C
∗
j )
µ∗i (C∗)
+ kǫ ≥ µi(Cj)
µ∗i (C∗)
≥ µ
∗
i (C
∗
j )
µ∗i (C∗)
− ǫ,
where ǫ, as before, is O(Mk/n).
Proof. Given a division C∗1 , . . . , C
∗
n of the divisible C
∗, we would like to divide the discrete C in a
way that approximates this division as closely as possible. That is, we would like to find a division
C1, . . . , Cn such that µi(Cj) ≈ µ∗i (C∗j ). We propose two schemes to do this: the random scheme
and the binned scheme. For both of them, we define an n-by-l matrix D (l being the number of
indivisible goods), where Dij is the fraction of good a
∗
j that belongs to C
∗
i : Dij = ν(C
∗
i ∩ a∗j).
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The random scheme. In the random scheme, we simply give player i good aj with probability
Dij (note that by the definition of D, Di· is a distribution). Then
E[µi(Cj)] =
∑
m
µi({am}) ·P[am ∈ Cj ] =
∑
m
µi({am}) ·Djm = µ∗i (C∗j )
and its standard deviation is O
(√
µ∗i (C
∗
j )
)
.
The binned scheme. In the binned scheme, we bin the elements of C into bins {BS} as above.
Without loss of generality, let there be, for each player i and bin BS, a single value DiS such that
Dim = DiS for all m. No generality is indeed lost: because all elements of a bin are equivalent to
all the players, then for any partition C∗j there exists an equivalent partition, in the sense of the
utilities of the players, for which such DiS ’s exist.
Let nS be the number of elements in bin BS . From each bin BS , we give player i a number of
goods equal to ⌊nSDiS⌋, picked from the uniform distribution over such partitions. Any leftover
am we give according to the random scheme, i.e. to player i with probability DiS .
The expectation for µi(Cj) clearly remains µ
∗
i (C
∗
j ). However, here we can bound it from below:
µi(Cj)
µ∗i (C∗)
≥ 1
µ∗i (C∗)
∑
BS∈B
(nSDiS − 1)si ≥
µ∗i (C
∗
j )
µ∗i (C∗)
− ǫ.
We can also bound it from above, by noting that the most a player can get beyond µi(Cj) is what’s
lost by the rest of the players:
µ∗i (C
∗
j )
µ∗i (C∗)
+ kǫ ≥ µi(Cj)
µ∗i (C∗)
A Existence of a distribution on partitions with positive proba-
bility for super-fair division
Let R be the set of finite unions of half-open intervals of [0, 1) ∈ R with rational endpoints. Let Q
be defined to be the class of partitions of [0, 1) ∈ R such that each part of the partition is in R.
The main lemma we want to prove is the following:
Lemma A.1. Let µ1, . . . , µk be non-atomic Borel measures on [0, 1) ∈ R and the Borel σ-algebra
B. Let B1, . . . , Bk be a partition of the interval, where Bi ∈ B and δ > 0. Then there exists a
partition Q1, . . . , Qk in Q such that µi(Bi△Qi) < δ for all i.
Proof. The proof uses the fact that Q is an algebra, i.e., it is closed under finite unions, intersections
and taking of complements. Let δ′ be chosen later. Since all of the measures are Borel we can find
open sets Oi,j so that Bj ⊂ Oi,j and µi(Oi,j△Bj) < δ′ (see, e.g., theorem 2.17 in [11]). Taking
Oj = ∩iOi,j, we get open sets such that Bj ⊂ Oj and µi(Bj△Oj) < δ′ for all i and j.
Fix j and note that Oj = ∪∞n=1Ij,n, where Ij,n are open intervals with rational end-points. Take
m sufficiently large so that µi(Oj \ ∪mn=1Ij,n) < δ′ for all i. Let Jj,n be the same as Ij,n except that
the left-end point of the interval is added and let P˜j = ∪mn=1Jj,n. Since the measures are non-atomic
we have µi(∪mn=1Jj,n) > µi(Oj) − δ′. Note that the P˜j ’s are all unions of half-open intervals with
rational end-points. Moreover, for all i and j,
µi(P˜j△Bj) ≤ µi(P˜j△Oj) + µi(Oj△Bj) ≤ 2δ′.
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Note further that for all i it holds that:
µi[0, 1) ≥ µi(∪jP˜j) ≥ µi(∪jOj)−
∑
j
µi(Oj \ ∪mn=1Ij,n) ≥ µi[0, 1) − kδ′,
so
µi([0, 1) \ ∪jP˜j) ≤ kδ′.
Now take Pi = P˜i for i > 1 and P1 = P˜1 ∪ ([0, 1) \ ∪jP˜j). Then ∪Pi = [0, 1) and
µi(Pj△Bj) ≤ (k + 2)δ′
for all i and j. The Pi are almost the desired partition. They satisfy all the needed properties
except that they are not a partition. We now take Qj = Pj \ ∪j′<jPj′ . Qj is obviously a partition.
Moreover:
µi(Qj△Bj) ≤ µi(Pj△Bj) +
∑
j′ 6=j
µi(Pj′△Bj)
≤ µi(Pj△Bj) +
∑
j′ 6=j
µi(Bj′△Bj) +
∑
j′ 6=j
µi(Pj′△Bj′)
≤ 2k(k + 2)δ′.
Taking δ′ = δ/(2k(k + 2)) concludes the proof.
Theorem A.2. Let µ1, . . . , µk be non-atomic probability measures on [0, 1) ∈ R and the Borel
σ-algebra, such that there exist i, j for which µi 6= µj. Let D be a distribution over the partitions
C1, . . . , Ck of [0, 1) into k sets, such that the support of D is Q. Then
PD[∀i : µi(Ci) > 1/k] > 0.
Proof. By Dubins and Spanier’s theorem, there exists a partition B1, . . . , Bk of measurable sets
such that for all i it holds that µi(Bi) > 1/k. Let ǫ > 0 be such that µi(Bi) > 1/k + ǫ.
By the lemma above there exists a partition Q1, . . . , Qk in Q such that ∀i, j : µi(Qj△Bj) < 12ǫ.
This, in particular, implies for all i that µi(Qi) > 1/k +
1
2ǫ.
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